The European Damages Directive fails to deliver, but can it be fixed?

March 3, 2015

(by Sebastian Peyer) The European Commission’s Damages Directive[1] was recently signed into law and the Member States have been given two years to implement the rules of the Damages Directive into national law. In this blog post I argue that the Directive fails to achieve its stated goal of compensation because it does not reduce litigation costs or incentivise the bringing of costly legal actions. Instead, the Damages Directive seeks to safeguard public enforcement from private follow-on actions. It is therefore unlikely to facilitate greater levels of private enforcement. For the Damages Directive to become effective, it should be supplemented with further legislation to incentivise stand-alone actions.[2] Read the rest of this entry »


Competition Law Compliance, Leniency and Corporate Governance: Between a Rock and a Hard Place?

November 26, 2014

(by Andreas Stephan). In the recent much talked about Automotive News article, ‘Confessions of a Price Fixer’, an anonymous Japanese car parts executive claims to have been incentivised by his firm to plead guilty to a US antitrust charge. The implication is that the firm did this to negotiate a lower fine with the US Department of Justice and possibly distract from the involvement of more senior employees. The individual, like many other Japanese executives involved in price fixing, has now served his time and is back at work with the same company. The story raises interesting questions about corporate governance; in particular firms’ failure to adequately discipline employees involved in cartel activity. However, even where there is a willingness to take action, the individuals involved in the infringement may hold all the cards. Read the rest of this entry »


Is the Head of Germany’s Bundeskartellamt Right to Suggest Criminal Law Sanctions are Too Severe for Cartels?

November 24, 2014

(by Andreas Stephan) It has been reported by Bloomberg Businessweek that the President of the German Federal Cartel Office recently expressed doubts as to whether criminal sanctions were necessary in the fight against cartels. His comments are indicative of the diverging approaches taken by cartel enforcement regimes. They are made all the more interesting by the fact Germany is one of the most active European enforcers of criminal law against bid-rigging arrangements and a suggestion by another Bundeskartellamt official that individual sanctions should be abandoned altogether. Read the rest of this entry »


European Pharmaceutical Antitrust after Groupment des Cartes Bancaires – Time to Rethink the Approach to Pay For Delay Settlements?

October 20, 2014

(by Sven Gallasch) Over the last year the European Commission has stepped up its enforcement efforts against pay for delay settlements[1]. In June 2013 they imposed a fine for the first time totalling €152 million, on a brand company (Lundbeck) and a number of generic companies for delaying the market entry of a cheaper generic version of Citalopram, an antidepressant drug. In subsequent decisions, the Commission imposed a fine of €16 million on Johnson & Johnson and Novartis for the delay of a generic pain-killer based on Fentanyl, and a fine in excess of €427 million on Servier and five generic companies in relation to the delay of generic version of the blood pressure drug Perindopril in July 2014 (see earlier blog post).

Although the full decisions are not yet in the public domain, it has become evident from the appeals against the Lundbeck decision that the Commission regards these pay for delay settlements as restrictions by object; they are assumed to be illegal without any effects analysis.[2] This blog post suggests that such an approach could prove costly for the Commission in the long run. Read the rest of this entry »


Pfizer/AstraZeneca and the Public Interest: Do Vince Cable’s Foreign Takeover Proposals Prescribe the Right Medication?

August 12, 2014

(by David Reader) When US pharmaceutical giant Pfizer sought to acquire its UK-listed counterpart AstraZeneca earlier this year, discussion centred around the supposed adverse impact that the merger could have on the UK’s science base, particularly in light of Pfizer’s questionable track record for asset-stripping and cutting investment in R&D. Although the proposed £69 billion takeover ultimately crumbled, the prospect of Pfizer returning with an improved offer later in the year has led many to ask whether the UK should adopt a tougher stance on foreign takeovers that threaten the national interest. The UK’s Business Secretary, Vince Cable MP, has since proposed new safeguards to counteract these perceived threats – but do they represent the best course of action in practice? Read the rest of this entry »


The EU Commission Decision against Servier – a New Dimension to European Pharmaceutical Antitrust?

July 11, 2014

(by Sven Gallasch) On 9 July 2014 the European Commission announced its decision to impose a fine of €427.7 million on French drug maker Servier and five generic companies in relation to so-called ‘pay for delay’ settlements concerning Servier’s bestselling blood pressure drug perindopril. The case differs from the Commission’s earlier decisions against Lundbeck and Johnson & Johnson in a number of rather notable aspects, which will be addressed in this blog post. Read the rest of this entry »


Competition Policy and Scottish Independence

July 1, 2014

(by Andreas Stephan) On 18 September 2014 Scottish residents will be asked whether Scotland should be an independent country. A discussion was held at the recent Antitrust Enforcement Symposium (held by the University of Oxford’s Centre for Competition Law and Policy) regarding competition policy in an independent Scotland. This blog piece focuses on the impact independence would have on competition enforcement in Britain. Read the rest of this entry »


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