The deterrence value of competition policy can and should be measured

August 17, 2017

(by Steve Davies) In a post last year, I argued that it was time for competition economists, both academics and practitioners, to start seriously tackling one of the big unknowns: how much harm is deterred by Competition Law and the Competition Authorities (CAs)? In this blog I pull together some results from three recently completed papers on cartel deterrence. I believe that these importantly move forward our understanding of this great unknown, and merit exposure to a non-academic audience in a non-technical way.

We have three ‘headline’ results. Read the rest of this entry »


European Commission launches new anonymous whistleblower tool, but who would use it?

March 21, 2017

(by Andreas Stephan) On 16 March 2017, the European Commission announced the launch of a new online tool to make it easier for individuals to alert it to secret cartels and other violations of competition law. What makes this tool innovative, is that it allows potential whistleblowers to maintain their anonymity via an encrypted messaging system, with two-way communication, giving them the confidence to report cartels. The tailor-made system is maintained by an external intermediary and is designed to be entirely secure. Read the rest of this entry »


The dangerously distorted incentives created by the CMA’s performance target

August 5, 2016

(by Bruce Lyons)[1]  The CMA has recently published its annual report and associated impact assessment.  Its performance management framework commits the CMA “to achieving direct financial benefit to consumers of at least ten times our cost to the taxpayer.” [Annual Report 2015-16, p.66].  Target setting and performance measurement are an important part of performance management.  However, the precise way that the government requires the CMA to justify its funding is dangerously distortionary. Read the rest of this entry »


Will much change in Antitrust post Brexit?

July 8, 2016

(by Andreas Stephan) The UK’s decision to leave the European Union has come as a shock to markets, politicians and indeed to many ‘Brexiteers’. Although protests demanding a reversal of the outcome and legal wrangling over Art 50  (the process for leaving the EU) continue, mainstream politicians have almost universally accepted the result (the obvious exception being in Scotland) and there is little evidence of public perceptions having shifted towards ‘Remain’ since the vote, despite accusations of a dishonest and misleading campaign by the ‘Leave’ camp. It is therefore almost certain that the UK will cease to be a full member of the EU. Bruce Lyons wrote about the (limited) advantages and (greater) disadvantages of Brexit for competition policy in an earlier blog, but here I suggest that much may remain the same regardless of what the UK’s new relationship with the EU ends up being. Read the rest of this entry »


Should markets be regulated in Brussels or London? Brexit and competition policy

May 26, 2016

(by Bruce Lyons) Much of the UK referendum debate jumps in on headline details about specific ‘regulatory burdens’ without thinking carefully about how to compare membership of the EU against life outside the single market.  In this post, I set out a framework for thinking about the economic advantages and disadvantages of having regulation harmonised across the EU (and possibly implemented centrally in Brussels), as compared with an independent UK-specific regulation (for implementation in London or the devolved nations).[1]  Read the rest of this entry »


Would Jeremy Corbyn as Prime Minister mean the end of Competition Policy?

August 17, 2015

(by Andreas Stephan) The UK’s Labour party is currently in the process of selecting a new leader. The front-runner, Jeremy Corbyn, may become Britain’s first socialist Prime Minister in a generation. This blog post considers what a Corbyn government could mean for competition policy. Read the rest of this entry »


Why harmed consumers may be more satisfied in the future – the CMA’s new redress scheme

June 12, 2015

(by Sebastian Peyer) In an earlier blog post I wrote about the new opt-out collective action regime introduced by the Consumer Rights Act 2015. This is not the only measure that is to help consumers and other injured parties to obtain compensation for the violation of EU and UK competition law. The new sections 49C-49E of the Competition Act 1998 provide powers for the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) to approve voluntary redress schemes. This blog post considers whether these are a welcome innovation. Read the rest of this entry »