Damage Quantification in Algorithmic Abuse Cases – the Elusive Counterfactual

(by Peter Ormosi) On the 5^th of  February 2024 the Competition Appeal Tribunal published a ruling to determine the carriage dispute in relation to two applications to commence collective proceedings against Amazon regarding Amazon’s Buy Box.[1] Interestingly, the ruling (which went unanimously in favour of Mr Hammond’s application) included a short discussion of the counterfactual.[2] The proposed method for the determining the counterfactual in Mr Hammond’s opt-out class action included re-running Amazon’s original algorithm without the abuse (and logging the resulting outcome as the counterfactual). The CAT seemed sympathetic to this solution. I personally think the proposal in Mr Hammond’s application is a viable approach, and I do believe the CAT must be commended for understanding the novelty of the issue and being open to a method untested in courts. But this ruling draws attention to a much more general question: how to find the counterfactual in a case where the offence is related to conduct by an algorithm?

Competition litigation funding doesn’t grow on trees – unintended consequences of the UKSC’s PACCAR decision

(by Sebastian Peyer, Adrian Render, Chris Thomas)The recent Supreme Court decision in PACCAR has put litigation funding in competition opt-out actions high on the agenda.[1] In this blog post we critically analyse an obiter (non-binding) statement the Supreme Court made in the judgment, which suggests the litigation funding and return on investment can only be recovered where not all damages awarded can be distributed to members of the class and only where the Competition Appeal Tribunal makes an order allowing funders to have any remaining funds. We argue that, despite the Court’s assertion, litigation funders can and must be paid before a potential damages award is distributed to the class upon judgment. Although the Supreme Court’s statement is not legally binding, the continuing uncertainty as to the recovery of funders’ success fees has a negative effect on the availability of litigation funding for opt-out collective actions, especially for ‘good’ claims on behalf of small and medium-sized groups.

You lose, you pay (some) – the CAT’s cost ruling in Walter Hugh Merricks

(by Sebastian Peyer) The burden of costs in civil litigation is considered of great importance to the incentives to recover damages in competition law. In particular, the ‘loser-pays’ rule that dominates European legal systems is thought to create significantly greater risks for prospective collective actions, in contrast to the American rule where each party is normally responsible for paying its own costs.[1]  The UK Competition Appeal Tribunal’s (‘CAT’) recent ruling on cost in Walter Hugh Merricks v MasterCard is therefore significant in thwarting an attempt to deviate from the loser-pays rule that is prevalent in English civil litigation and striking a balance between applicants’ and respondents’ interests. Earlier this year, the CAT rejected an application for an opt-out collective proceedings order (‘CPO’) under section 47B of the Competition Act 1998 (see my comment here). The question that the CAT still had to answer was who would bear the cost of that unsuccessful CPO application and to what extent are the actual costs incurred recoverable. In its decision, the CAT stressed that the loser-pays rule applies to CPO applications, but reiterated that the parties’ expenses must be proportionate in order to be recoverable. This means that parties cannot inflate their expenses to discourage would-be claimants.

Does the CAT’s fast-track procedure strike the right balance between claimants and defendants?

(by Sebastian Peyer) The Consumer Rights Act 2015 significantly expanded the jurisdiction of the Competition Appeal Tribunal (‘CAT’).[1] The Tribunal can now adjudicate stand-alone damages claims, award permanent and interim injunctions,[2] allow opt-out collective proceedings (see previous blog post) and deal with claims in the new Fast Track Procedure (‘FTP’). Enforcement mechanisms prior to 2015 were ineffective for small and medium sized enterprises (‘SMEs’) because of the high cost associated with bringing such actions before the High Court and the narrow jurisdiction of the Competition Appeals Tribunal (‘CAT’) for follow-on damages actions. A comparative glance at Germany showed that claimants had a strong preference for simply stopping anti-competitive behaviour through an injunction, yet even this simple tool was considered costly and complex in England. Since the introduction of the 2015 Act, a number of claimants have applied for the fast track procedure and the CAT has awarded one injunction in the FTP (Socrates Training Limited v The Law Society of England and Wales).[3]  The FTP appears to be both effective at capping costs to reasonable levels and, more importantly, at providing a credible mechanism to encourage out of court settlements.

Has the CAT’s MasterCard decision killed off opt-out class actions by indirect purchasers?

(by Sebastian Peyer) On 21 July the Competition Appeal Tribunal (‘CAT’) rejected an application for an opt-out collective proceedings order (‘CPO’) in Walter Hugh Merricks v Mastercard Inc, thereby  blocking the largest opt-out competition claim brought in the UK to date and one of the first large indirect purchaser actions. The applicant brought the claim on behalf of 46.2 million people asking Mastercard for around £14 billion in compensation. Despite the negative outcome for the applicant (and millions of consumers), the CAT’s decision has clarified a number of important points for future CPO applications. But the Tribunal’s decision may have also inadvertently raised the bar for indirect purchaser claims.