Pfizer and Flynn: How are ‘excessive’ prices for generic drugs possible and should competition authorities do more about exploitative pricing?

December 16, 2016

(by Farasat Bokhari & Bruce Lyons) Last week the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) imposed a fine of approximately £90 million on Pfizer and a generic manufacturer Flynn Pharma, on the grounds that each abused a dominant position by charging excessive and unfair prices for phenytoin sodium capsules, an anti-epilepsy drug (brand name Epanutin). The price of a pack of 84 capsules of 100MG increased from £2.83 to £67.50 in October 2012.   This came about as part of a deal where Pfizer sold the distribution rights in the UK to Flynn Pharma, who in turn ‘de-branded’ the drug, and sold the generic at an inflated price.   The drug in question is not protected by any patents, so other generics are available and further generic entry is possible, yet the branded original drug was replaced by a higher priced generic.  The CMA’s case is a rare example of an abuse of dominance finding (under Art. 102 and/or Ch.2 of CA98) in relation to exploitative pricing. While we await the full published decision, it is worth looking at industry price and quantity data to contextualise the CMA’s case. We also try to understand how this price hike was possible and ask whether the CMA should pursue more exploitative pricing cases. Read the rest of this entry »

BT Separation: The end of a beautiful relationship?

December 14, 2016

(by Richard Cadman) Earlier this year Ofcom, the UK’s regulator for electronic communications markets, proposed that BT’s Openreach division should become a legally separate company within the BT Group, but this has been resisted by the company. In response, Ofcom have referred their proposal to the European Commission to force through the changes. Its proposal follows from its Strategic Review of Digital Communications (DCR) launched in March 2015. In that review it concluded that, although the current “functional separation” model worked well in deterring operational discrimination by BT against retail competitors that relied on its network, BT was still able to make strategic discrimination choices by designing the network to suit its own purposes. Ofcom was also concerned about the lack of fibre based broadband to residential customers. This blog argues that OfCom’s approach is unlikely to achieve anything more than BT’s own proposals. Read the rest of this entry »

Clinton’s proposed ban on pay-for-delay deals would do little to lower drug prices

September 30, 2016

(By Farasat Bokhari)[1]  Banning “pay-for-delay” deals that postpone the production of less-expensive generic drugs is a key action point in Hillary Clinton’s comprehensive plan to lower prescription drug costs. Eliminating these deals could, indeed, save Americans billions of dollars on medications. An even more productive strategy would be to stop drug makers from producing “authorized” generics. Read the rest of this entry »

General Court’s pay for delay judgment in Lundbeck – some guidance, but worries remain

September 14, 2016

(by Sven Gallasch) On 8 September, the General Court handed down its eagerly awaited decision in Lundbeck – the first ever European judgment concerning so-called pay for delay settlements. The Commission’s decision in this case was heavily criticised by practitioners as well as academics like myself for taking the view that agreements in question would constitute a ‘restriction by object’. In a previous blog I argued that the Commission might have pushed it too far by finding this kind of agreement an object restriction, especially in the light of the Court of Justice’s decision in Groupement des Cartes Bancaires, where it was held that such restrictions should be interpreted ‘restrictively’. It is therefore perhaps surprising that the General Court has rejected every one of the 10 arguments (by my count) put forward by Lundbeck, and has upheld the Commission’s decision in its entirety – even the level of the fine. Read the rest of this entry »

Why have Mylan launched a generic EpiPen?

August 30, 2016

(by Farasat Bokhari) In a new development surrounding the controversy of price hikes of Mylan’s lifesaving drug EpiPen, the manufacturer announced that it will introduce a generic version, and sell the new drug at half the price of its branded version. Mylan has increased the price of its EpiPen injections from about $100 in 2009 to over $600 this year and will sell the generic at $300, and has come under scrutiny and strong criticism from public and government officials alike.  Mylan are not alone in increasing drug prices in recent times. For instance, Martin Shkreli increased the price of Daraprim by 5000 percent in 2015. However, that was to do with a hit-and-run opportunity that arose out of its orphan drug status, and the speed with which a rival generic could gain approval to enter the market (see my earlier post, ‘The Economics of a $750 Pill’).

Leaving aside the issue that the generic is still three times more expensive than the original 2009 price, this announcement has left some puzzling over why, or rather how, such a move makes any sense.  To paraphrase the incredulity expressed by Richard Quest of CNN, why would anyone pay $600 for a drug when the exact same product by the same company is also available for $300?  How does Mylan stand to gain anything from this move? Read the rest of this entry »

We need to quantify deterrence when evaluating Competition Authorities: a response to Bruce Lyons’s Blog Post

August 19, 2016

(by Steve Davies) The time has come for us to stop ducking out of the big deterrence issue in competition policy – more precisely, the measurement thereof. This blog has been provoked by Bruce Lyons’s excellent recent blog, in which he argues that the performance target placed on the CMA by government may have serious adverse consequences for the Authority’s incentives to undertake those investigations which generate relatively small measurable direct benefits, but potentially very large, unquantified, deterrent effects. Read the rest of this entry »

The dangerously distorted incentives created by the CMA’s performance target

August 5, 2016

(by Bruce Lyons)[1]  The CMA has recently published its annual report and associated impact assessment.  Its performance management framework commits the CMA “to achieving direct financial benefit to consumers of at least ten times our cost to the taxpayer.” [Annual Report 2015-16, p.66].  Target setting and performance measurement are an important part of performance management.  However, the precise way that the government requires the CMA to justify its funding is dangerously distortionary. Read the rest of this entry »